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Introduction
As safety professionals, we strive to implement a robust safety process in our organizations to 
maximize worker protection. We sell our philosophy and ideas to senior management, and then 
work with line management and the work force to develop and implement the safety process. 
Through this effort, we are likely to accomplish two major objectives. First, we obtain buy-in 
from line management and the workers, maybe even ownership for the safety process we 
implement. Second, we increase the likelihood that the hazards (and necessary controls) 
associated with the work activities performed by our workforce are identified and addressed by 
the safety process we implement. Our ambition is to maximize safety and health in the work 
place, and prevent injuries. Realizing this goal improves overall business operations.
Petersen suggests an accident is an indication of something wrong in the management 
system (Petersen, pg 15). Successful organizations operate with the safety process fully integrated 
into the management system. If the management system fails, the safety process has failed the 
worker. As safety professionals, we must ask ourselves whether we did our job adequately. The 
better organizations strive for continuous improvement.
The overall success of safety processes, in terms of accident and injury prevention has 
improved since safety professionals have learned to involve line management and the workers in 
the process. Although we maintain the label of “safety expert”, our role has shifted somewhat to 
that of a “facilitator” in the process. The role of the safety professional is to advise and counsel 
line management (Kohn & Ferry, pg 28). Line management owns safety! If you subscribe to this 
philosophy, our role of advisor to line management makes perfect sense. Most safety 
professionals no longer operate as the “safety cop”. That role belongs to line management. 
Instead, our role falls into the category of “oversight” or facilitator. We observe systems, 
processes and work activities, and then convey our findings and observations to line management. 
We advise them with regard to what they need to do, and then we help them find workable 
methods to implement those solutions. Line management owns the responsibility to implement 
the process and to monitor safety on a daily basis. Safety professionals advocate safety and 
facilitate process implementation. We help line management meet their responsibilities with 
regard to safety.
Maximizing safety performance is achieved by maximizing the safety process. Robust 
safety processes serve as the model and are earmarked by vigorous support of both labor and 
management. Where a robust safety process exists, the safety professional enjoys interest and 
support on the part of management and workers. People are motivated to achieve success and 
willingly accept their roles and responsibilities. Work activities are appropriately planned. 
Hazards are identified and controlled to safeguard the worker. Work activities are reviewed on a 
regular basis to avoid the process becoming stale. Goals are established and communicated and 
serve as a basis on which performance can be measured. People throughout the organization 
understand their role and responsibilities and are accountable for meeting them.
Attributes of a Robust Safety Process
Robust safety processes can be achieved through multiple approaches to safety and health. 
Although it may be difficult to capture the varied approaches in a single definition, robust safety 
processes are characterized by the following:
· Strong, relentless commitment and support from senior management
· Technically competent, motivated safety professionals
· A culture that encourages self-reporting of incidents and near misses
· Successful implementation of process fundamentals including systems for hazard 
identification, analysis and correction, employee involvement at the grassroots level, accident 
investigation and employee training
· A system for coordinating work activity and safety across departments, contractors, etc
· Mechanisms facilitating worker feedback to management
· A desire to achieve “world class” status in safety
Understanding These Attributes
Senior management demonstrates support for the safety process in many ways. Financial support 
is important, but is far from being the only support necessary from senior management for 
success in safety. Robust processes are characterized by a senior management team that walks 
and talks the safety process. Senior management establishes safety-related goals and ensures they 
are clearly communicated at all levels in the organization. Management walkabout programs are 
used to get managers into the work space leading a team of people there for the purpose of 
evaluating safety and identifying non-compliances. Senior managers begin meetings with a safety 
topic. They review near misses as well as accidents that might have occurred, and participate in 
determining and implementing corrective actions. Senior management leads the celebration of 
safety process achievements. The process is managed with apparent rigor.
The safety and health staff must be technically competent and motivated to help bring the 
safety process to the highest level. These are the people senior management looks to for 
leadership and ideas. Robust processes are characterized by motivation – at all levels in the 
organization. The best processes are led by a tirelessly motivated management team that includes 
the safety professional. Successful safety professionals are able to meld their technical knowledge 
and common sense to develop effective, manageable solutions to the problems in the workplace.
Robust safety processes foster a caring culture that encourages people to self-report 
incidents and near misses for the purpose of ensuring they are properly investigated to prevent 
recurrence. These are not cultures of “blame”. Instead, individuals are appreciated for bringing 
concerns to management and they are encouraged to participate in the process to mitigate system 
or process shortcomings. Management communicates findings openly and takes definite actions 
to correct deficiencies.
Robust systems are built on a strong foundation of fundamentals. Many organizations 
implement the tools necessary to achieve a model process without ever realizing the achievement. 
The difference with the more successful efforts is in the quality of implementation, and the level 
of motivation demonstrated at the highest levels. Systems for hazard identification, analysis and 
correction are fundamental to a safety process. Robust processes involve employees at all levels 
in the organization and clearly establish responsibility for implementation at the manager level. 
Management participation and accountability make it happen. Management resolve, or 
the attitude management has toward loss prevention is the ultimate driver of safety performance 
(Kohn & Ferry, pg 39). Formal management walkabout programs can be used as a means to 
identify hazards and non-compliant situations. The inspection team, in consultation with the 
safety professional, analyzes the hazard and develops corrective actions (including the 
identification of the individual responsible for mitigation). Individual findings are added to a 
tracking system where they can be monitored through completion of the corrective actions. 
Employee involvement is achieved in many ways. Grassroots safety committees are a good 
example. Other methods include worker participation in the management walkabout process and 
on teams formed to investigate near misses and accidents. In a robust process, accident 
investigations are done to determine what went wrong in the system, and to identify and 
implement mitigation measures that substantially reduce the chances of recurrence. Managers in a 
robust process strive to improve, they look for true causes associated with an event and spend 
time developing meaningful corrective measures. Results are shared with the work force to ensure 
everyone understands what went wrong and what has been put in place to prevent something 
similar from happening again. Employee training is a component of every safety program. In a 
robust process, employee training is tailored to meet the needs of the situation, and the need for 
workers to receive training is valued by managers similar to how they value other requirements 
they have responsibility for. Appropriate levels of planning occur to ensure training can be 
completed without jeopardizing schedule. Meager safety processes defer  training, or postpone it, 
until it is convenient for them.
Robust safety processes include mechanisms for coordinating work across departments. 
In construction environments, work must be coordinated between contractors. The coordination 
of work activity is important to s maximize afety. The need for work coordination presents itself 
any time someone is brought into an area they normally do not work in to complete a work task. 
For example, when a worker (or a team) from Facilities Maintenance is brought into a research 
lab to remove and replace floor tile, their safety may be at risk from potential hazards inherent to 
the room (such as exposure to a chemical process) they will be working in. Similarly, the crew 
may create additional hazards (for the work crew and room residents) during the completion of 
their work. Coordination, in this sense, means identifying these sets of hazards, and necessary 
controls, before the work is started. When determining necessary controls, the safety professional 
must consider hazards already present in the work area and those the workers may create when 
performing the work. In addition, consideration to room ventilation must be considered as 
appropriate for the job. Organizations with robust safety processes handle this process well. 
Internal mechanisms, such as work permits, bridging documents, etc., can be used to ensure the 
work team coming into an area is familiar with the hazards inherent to the space and that hazards 
associated with the work performed by the team (and associated impact) are identified and 
appropriately controlled. However this process is handled, the procedure must include the 
appropriate level of management participation, signature and hazard analysis. Organizations with 
robust safety processes effectively monitor the work activity to ensure the work is performed 
according to the controls established for the job.
Safety professionals understand the value of feedback coming from the worker. 
Individuals performing the work generally understand associated hazards and often present viable 
ideas to improve safety. Robust programs ask for employee feedback. Systems are established for 
employees to make suggestions and register concerns. Input goes directly to management for 
disposition. Formal systems can be pen and pencil or electronic. Either way, the key is to get the 
feedback to the responsible manager in a timely manner, and for that manager to act prudently on 
the feedback.
Organizations that maximize safety performance do not get there by chance. The 
management team wants to achieve “world class” performance and is committed to achieve that 
goal. Organizational culture is key. In such organizations, the culture is one where senior 
management demands the best in the safety process. They demand a visionary or world class 
process (Kohn & Ferry, pg 44). They recognize that getting there is a difficult process, and they 
are committed to working just as hard to maintain that level of performance.
As previously mentioned, many of the attributes found in a robust safety process are 
common in most safety programs. The difference is in the implementation of the process. 
Organizations implementing robust safety processes understand that regulatory compliance is a 
baseline approach to managing safety. Compliance can help the organization avoid fines from 
OSHA, but it may not control the occurrence of accidents (Gualardo, pg 208). Senior 
management must walk the talk. They must be an advocate for the process and tirelessly 
demonstrate their belief in it. As they do with other segments of the business, senior management 
must employ a desire for continuous improvement in the area of safety and health. Senior 
management must regularly convey, to the management team, the importance of maximizing 
safety. To be effective in this regard, senior management must talk in terms of “we”, not “you”. 
To do otherwise creates an “us versus them” environment and fails to promote continuous 
improvement. Senior management might delegate some of the responsibilities associated with the 
safety process, but the ownership of the process stays with them. They hold ultimate 
responsibility.
Single Point Failure – A Trap To Avoid
In any safety process, single point failures are a concern. It is a concern whenever “safety” is 
dependent on a single individual doing something in reaction to something else. Processes that 
require two or more people to ensure a specific task is completed are less likely to experience 
failure because that specific task was not done. For example, a procedure that requires an 
experimenter to survey a shipping package upon receipt and notify the safety professional only 
when radioactive levels exceed a pre-determined threshold rely solely on the experimenter to act 
as expected. Greater safety will be achieved by a procedure that requires the experimenter to 
survey the package upon initial receipt, followed by the safety professional performing additional 
surveying in the lab after the package is moved to it’s final destination. The desired procedure 
would require the experimenter to immediately notify the safety professional whenever his/her 
survey results exceeded specified levels, but “safety” is not dependent soley on his or her actions.. 
However, the single-point failure (experimenter failing to notify the safety professional when 
results are high) is avoided by requiring redundant surveys of the package.
The bridging document serves as another example of ways to avoid a single point failure. 
This document requires signatures from the work team leader and supporting management and 
management from the facility where the work will take place. Signatures occur after a safety 
briefing, addressing inherent and potential hazards associated with the work, takes place. It 
documents that all of the necessary work authorization protocol has been completed prior to 
beginning the work. It serves as a method for multiple organizations to communicate existing and 
potential hazards and controls before a work activity is authorized.
A Case Study – What Went Wrong
Safety professionals are dedicated to accident prevention. Serious accidents are cause for concern 
that the process implemented was less than adequate, and that the safety professional could have 
done better. In organizations with a robust safety process, senior management reacts to a serious 
accident in the same way that dedicated safety professionals do. The accident discussed below 
was a serious event. It occurred even though the organization had a robust safety process in place.
The maintenance department was tasked with replacing the smoke detectors located in 
the high bays in one of the buildings on the site, B-334. The detectors had not previously received 
biennial calibration as the code required due to the difficulty associated with accessing them. The 
detectors in question were attached to the ceiling about 33 feet above the floor (see Figure One) 
and some detectors were located above or near HVAC duct. Fixed equipment and a pit in the high 
bay further complicated access to the detectors. The scope of work called for the replacement 
detectors to be a newer model that are self-checking and do not require the biennial calibration. 
The work team consisted of 3 people, the work team leader and 2 technicians. The work 
team leader completed documentation to authorize the work. A bridging document was used to 
coordinate the work (between the maintenance department and facility management) and, upon 
completion, it was reviewed with the Facility Point of Contact (FPOC) and signed. The only 
Figure One
hazard noted on the bridging document was the need for the bridge crane to be locked out of 
service before work could begin. 
The work team leader and the FPOC agreed that the use of a manlift would be the most 
feasible method for accessing the detectors in the building. The work team acquired a JLG 60 lift 
from the maintenance yard on the afternoon before they were to initiate work. The JLG 60 is an 
articulated boom manlift that operates on either gasoline or propane fuel. Although the 
organization had several different models of lifts on site, the JLG 60 was the only one available at 
the time this work was to be performed. The lift was larger than what the work team expected. 
Originally, the crew planned to begin work in the West bay of the building. Because the JLG 60 
would not fit in the West bay, the crew decided to begin in the East Bay. No revisions were made 
to the safety documentation. The East bay is approximately 40’ wide by 50’ long by 33’ high and 
is equipped with it’s own ventilation system. The ventilation system is a recirculation system 
operating at a nominal design 1.3% outside air make-up rate.
The following day, the technician who would be operating the manlift began reviewing 
the operator manual for the lift to become familiar with this particular machine. The technician 
was qualified to operate the lift by training, however, she had not actually operated a manlift 
since completing the hands on portion of qualification training approximately 4.5 years earlier. 
Due to security requirements in this area, the technician was not allowed to practice operating the 
manlift in the yard outside of the building. Once the large doors to the East bay had been opened 
by security, the technician was authorized to move the manlift into the building. The technician 
was not comfortable maneuvering the manlift into the building. Another worker in the area, not 
part of this work team, was brought in to maneuver the lift into the building. Once the lift was in 
the building, the second operator did a check to verify that the boom would reach to the vicinity 
of each detector. At that point, the engine was shut off and the manlift was turned over to the 
work team.
The technician entered the manlift and prepared to maneuver it to the first detector head. 
The work team leader remained on the ground, acting as the assistant. The third member of the 
crew was stationed on the third floor and was assigned to monitor the fire alarm panel during the 
work process. The Facility Point of Contact, thinking that two armed security officers would be 
required if the large doors remained opened, and that the building ventilation system was 
adequate to operate the manlift indoors when fueled by propane, opted to have the large doors  
closed. The work team leader was told the manlift should be operated only as long as necessary to 
move the platform into position at the detector heads and then shut off while the detector heads 
were changed.
The technician donned a fall protection harness and lanyard and prepared to initiate work. 
Shortly thereafter, the technician encountered difficulty identifying various controls for the 
manlift. The decals and control panel labels were obscured by paint and defaced by weather 
exposure.  The technician had such difficulty trying to access the first detector that the second 
operator was brought back to review the controls with her. At that point the technician 
maneuvered the manlift into position for the NW detector and completed the replacement. The 
engine, fueled by propane, was kept running during the work because of the need to frequently 
position the platform. As the technician began to access the second detector, about 1 hour into the 
job, she began to feel physiological symptoms of exposure including fatigue, irritability, thirst 
and butterflies. She mentioned this to the team leader and asked for a drink of water. As the team 
leader went for water, the technician began to lower the platform, eventually stopping the 
platform about 10 feet above the floor due to the railings around the pit (see Figure Two). The 
technician shut down the engine and sat on the floor of the platform. When the team leader 
returned with water, he realized there was a problem and used a nearby ladder to access the 
technician. He got the technician out of the basket and out of the building. The third 
member of the team was called out of the building. The technician was treated by on site 
paramedics and recovered fully. The first CO monitoring occurred approximately 30 minutes 
after the engine had been shut off and measured 854 PPM at floor level.
What Went Wrong
This incident occurred even though the Organization has implemented a robust
safety process.
Some of the failure points will be discussed below:
1. The bridging document was completed but only included the need to lock the bridge crane 
out of service. The document was not revisited when the work team determined the need to 
use a manlift indoors. Safety documentation must be considered dynamic and should be 
updated (revisited) when conditions or work methods change.
2. The original scope of work did not include the use of a manlift indoors. This decision was 
made due to difficulty accessing detectors located in the high bay from ladders. The decision 
was not clearly communicated to the maintenance supervisor or the H&S Team. Changes to 
work methods can impact safety and should be clearly communicated to management and the 
safety team whenever adverse impact to safety is possible.
3. The building Point of Contact was not familiar with the subject HVAC system and made an 
assumption that it was okay to operate the manlift with the doors closed. Assumptions can not 
be allowed when consequences can impact safety. The Point of Contact is responsible to 
provide accurate input or ask for help when necessary.
4. The Facility Point of Contact made the decision to operate the manlift indoors with the doors 
closed based on a mistaken assumption that two armed guards would be required if the doors 
were kept open. He failed to investigate requirements fully. This assumption was based (in 
Figure Two
part) on the incorrect assumption that the use of a propane powered engine would be safe 
indoors. Tests following this incident proved the opposite. 
5. The technician assigned to operate the manlift was qualified by training, but not by 
experience. Neither the technician or the work team leader recognized her lack of experience 
to be a potential hazard. Careful consideration must be given to the requirements for refresher 
training. Should an individual who completed training more than four years earlier, having 
not operated a manlift since training, be considered qualified to operate a manlift? 
6. The H&S Team supporting this area of the organization was never brought in to complete a 
hazard assessment for the work activity. No one from the facility or the work team 
recognized the need for a hazard assessment (by safety professionals) when the decision to 
use a manlift indoors was made. Again, changing conditions warrant reconsideration of the 
hazards and concerns. The safety process implemented at this organization requires a review 
of safety concerns when conditions change, people in a position to recognize this need failed 
to do so.
This incident was serious and easily could have progressed into a fatality. While the 
investigation committee determined the direct cause to be the use of an internal combustion 
engine indoors with less than adequate safety controls, there were several people (with 
opportunities) who failed to recognize the hazard. The incident enlightened the organization, 
confident that their robust safety process was world class, and resulted in several 
recommendations to enhance safety.
Self-assessment Techniques Can Strengthen Your Process
Anyone can look at a process after an incident and identify where safety was less than 
adequate. We are also able to develop process enhancements that will strengthen the safety 
process. Unfortunately, in this scenario an incident has already occurred. One or more people 
may already have been seriously injured. Our efforts are too late for them. The ideal time to 
strengthen the safety process is before the incident occurs. Self-assessments are one way to 
do that.
Self-assessments serve an important purpose. However, they are little more than being 
proactive by reviewing (or evaluating) yourself against stated criteria. Self-assessments focus 
on specific areas and help you, and your Organization, answer the question, “how well am I 
doing what I’ve said I will do?” 
World Class Organizations develop a self-assessment program and manage it. The 
program identifies what topical areas will be assessed during the course of the year and 
requires written results. Either management or safety professionals may perform the actual 
assessments. Findings, or deficiencies are documented in a database and are tracked 
throughout corrective action. Senior managers ensure that corrective actions happen.
For example, an Organization may select the use and storage of compressed gas 
cylinders/systems as an area for assessment. Using OSHA requirements and their own H&S 
manual, a checklist can be developed to assess compliance in the Organization relative to the 
requirements associated with the use and storage of compressed gas. 
To complete the assessment, members of the H&S department may be selected to walk 
the areas they support to locate compressed gas in use. For each instance, the “In Use” form 
will be completed. When assessments are completed in all areas subject to the assessment, the 
results can be tabulated to yield a “snapshot” of compliance to requirements. As with other 
data, the results can be evaluated for trends in non-compliances and potential serious 
deficiencies. As warranted, special emphasis campaigns can be introduced to improve 
performance and enhance safety. If necessary, the H&S manual can be revised, employee 
training can be modified, or work procedures can be changed to address the type of 
deficiencies observed during the self-assessment.
Hazard Evaluation Techniques That Work
A variety of hazard evaluation techniques are available to the safety professional. Common 
techniques, including work area inspections, roundtable reviews of proposed work activities, 
and the Job Hazard Analysis are effective if done properly, and with employee participation. 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has developed an elaborate Work 
Authorization process that uses an Integration Work Sheet (IWS) to authorize work activities 
above those normally performed by the public. Members of the ES&H Team that support the 
area where the work will be performed are involved in the review of the IWS. In many cases, 
a roundtable is scheduled to facilitate this review. A roundtable includes the Responsible 
Individual (RI) and the appropriate ES&H Team professionals. The RI is knowledgeable with 
regard to the proposed work and associated equipment. During the roundtable, the RI 
explains the work proposal and the equipment, chemicals, gases, etc., that will be used. Team 
members have the chance to see the room and it’s infrastructure and they are given the 
opportunity to ask questions about the activity. Roundtables generally take an hour to 
complete and usually help the safety professionals expedite their review of the IWS. With 
knowledge of the proposed work and the room where the work would occur, the safety 
professional is likely to complete a thorough hazard assessment.
The IWS is a detailed work authorization document. Major topics addressed in the IWS 
include:
1. Scope of Work
2. Work period (start and completion dates)
3. Work locations
4. Management chain responsible for the work activity
5. List of workers assigned to the work activity
6. Specific hazards and necessary controls to safeguard workers
7. Maintenance and Inspection requirements
8. Emergency Response Plans and Procedures
9. Worker specific training requirements
10. Attached/referenced documents supplementing the IWS
11. Medical surveillance/certification requirements
12. Authorizing Signatures
Workers assigned to the activity are required to read and sign the IWS before they are 
authorized to perform the work activity.
This sort of work authorization system can be an effective tool for safety improvement. 
Similar to the more commonly used tools, the effectiveness of the IWS is dependent on how 
well they are done. If the scope of work is not complete, there may be potential hazards 
associated with the work that are not identified, therefore, not evaluated. Necessary safety 
controls may be overlooked. A primary function of the roundtable is to establish a clear, 
complete scope of work. Even a well thought out IWS, completed properly, is not an 
effective safety improvement tool if it isn’t used properly. Pre-start meetings, led by line 
management, involve the workers involved in the work activity and members of the ES&H 
Team. Line management reviews the IWS, focusing on hazards and controls and leads 
discussion about the work activity. These meetings are augmented with daily tail gate, or 
work team safety meetings.
The desire for continuous improvement is what drives an organization to world class 
safety. Safety professionals play an important role in the process. Robust programs require 
effective use of management techniques – planning, organizing, directing and controlling 
(Friend and Kohn, pg 221). Todays safety professional must be competent in all phases of 
management to effectively facilitate a world class safety process.
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